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Abstract 
 
Herman Philipse argues that Christian belief cannot be warranted in Alvin Plantinga’s sense. 
More specifically, he thinks it is impossible for intellectually responsible and modern believers 
to hold their religious beliefs in the manner of properly basic beliefs, not on the basis of explicit 
evidence or arguments. In this paper, we consider his objections to Plantinga’s work and argue 
that they all fail. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Herman Philipse thinks that Christian belief lacks the warrant of properly basic beliefs, at least 
for intellectually responsible modern believers. That is to say, he thinks that a modern Christian 
believer cannot be rational in holding on to her religious beliefs without engaging in natural 
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theology, i.e., offering explicit evidence and arguments in defense of these beliefs, or at least 
relying on experts in her community to do so. To argue for his position, he offers a threefold — 
or fourfold, more on that later — criticism of Alvin Plantinga’s defense of the possible 
warrantedness of Christian belief.1 In this paper, we will scrutinize Philipse’s criticisms and 
argue that they are uncompelling. Far from being ‘shipwrecked’2, Plantinga’s account of the 
warrant of Christian belief survives unscathed, holding as much water as it ever did. 
 We start with a brief rehearsal of the essentials of Plantinga’s account of how Christian 
belief can have basic warrant in the next section. We then present and evaluate Philipse’s 
objections in sections 3 through 6, arguing that none of them succeeds. 
 
2. Warranted Christian Belief 
 
Warrant, according to Plantinga, is 
 
that further quality or quantity (perhaps it comes in degrees), whatever precisely it may 
be, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief.3 
 
The basic conditions that a belief must satisfy in order to have warrant are as follows:  
  
[A] belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive 
faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that 
is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is 
successfully aimed at truth.4 
 
Under these conditions, if a person S holds her warranted belief that p firmly enough, and if p is 
true, she knows that p. A few points of clarification. First, warrant is understood in terms of 
proper function, which in turn is closely connected to a design plan. Cognitive faculties, like 
organs and body parts, ought to function in certain ways. Doing so is what they are for. This is 
because they have been designed (by God or processes of evolution) to function in these ways. 
Cognitive faculties function properly when they function in accord with their design plan. 
Second, proper functioning is relativized to cognitive environments; cognitive faculties do not 
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deliver reliable outputs in any sort of environment, but only in appropriate environments. The 
human visual system is unreliable in the deep ocean, but highly reliable in broad daylight. Third, 
warranted beliefs must have been produced by faculties the aim of which is to produce true 
beliefs, as opposed to, say, beliefs that are good for survival or personal happiness. Fourth, the 
design plan must be a good one. It should not just aim at the production of true beliefs, but be 
successful at that. When cognitive faculties function in accord with it, they should indeed 
produce mostly true beliefs. 
 To get from the basic account of warrant to the claim that theistic, and specifically 
Christian, belief can be warranted, Plantinga appeals to the idea of a sensus divinitatis. The 
sensus is a cognitive faculty that, when functioning properly, produces true religious beliefs in 
humans. These beliefs are produced in the basic way, not on the basis of explicit evidence or 
arguments but directly, much like perceptual beliefs or memory beliefs. If theism is correct, says 
Plantinga, it is likely that God gave people a cognitive faculty like the sensus divinitatis, the 
purpose of which is to produce true religious beliefs in the cognitive environment in which 
people typically find themselves.5 The sensus divinitatis produces general theistic beliefs, but 
Plantinga also maintains that ‘the full panoply of Christian belief in all its particularity’ can be 
warranted. Specifically Christian beliefs, he says,  
 
do not come to the Christian just by way of (…) the cognitive faculties with which we 
human beings were originally created; they come instead by way of the work of the Holy 
Spirit, who gets us to accept, causes us to believe, these great truths of the gospel.6 
 
Since the workings of the Holy Spirit can be conceived of as a special kind of properly 
functioning cognitive process, Christian beliefs, too, fit the basic account of how beliefs can 
come to have warrant. As Plantinga draws inspiration from claims made by Aquinas and Calvin, 
he dubs this account of how Christian belief can be warranted the extended Aquinas/Calvin 
(A/C) model.7 
 Anticipating later discussion of objections, we draw attention to a few features of the A/C 
model. First of all, Plantinga claims that it is broadly logically possible, i.e., free from 
contradiction. It is, moreover, also epistemically possible, i.e., consistent with what we know. It 
thus offers Christians (and others) a way to conceive of the positive epistemic status of Christian 
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beliefs. (Which is of course not to say that their thus conceiving of said status is a condition for 
their beliefs having it!) Although he himself believes the model to be true, or at least close to the 
truth, he does not claim to show that it is true. Instead, he argues for a conditional claim: If 
theism is true, then it is likely that theistic belief is warranted in something like the way 
Plantinga describes. The dialectical import of this maneuver is that it rules out objections to the 
warrantedness (rationality, justification) of Christian belief that are not also objections to its 
truth.8 
 Secondly, Plantinga’s account of warrant is externalist. Externalism in epistemology is 
typically contrasted with internalism. One can be an internalist or externalist with regard to 
various positive epistemic statuses, such as justification, rationality, warrant, and knowledge. 
Crucial to the distinction between externalism and internalism is whether or not it is required that 
a person has cognitive access to the factors that determine a belief’s positive epistemic status. A 
recent handbook characterizes the difference as follows: 
 
The most generally accepted account of this distinction is that a theory of justification is 
internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be 
epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively accessible to that person, internal 
to his cognitive perspective.9 
 
Although this characterization concerns justification, the same can be said for other positive 
epistemic statuses. Externalism is the denial of internalism. It is the thesis that not all of the 
factors needed for a belief to have the relevant positive epistemic status for a person must be 
internal to that person’s cognitive perspective. 
 With the above characterizations of internalism and externalism in hand, we can readily 
see that Plantinga’s account of warrant is paradigmatically externalist. None of the conditions for 
warrant require any sort of cognitive access on the part of the subject. In order for a subject to 
have warranted beliefs, she does not need to be aware, know, or even believe truly that her 
beliefs have been produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, operating in an 
appropriate environment according to a successful design plan aimed at true belief. Subjects can 
have warranted true beliefs and thus knowledge without having second-order beliefs about this. 
 Philipse, however, characterizes externalism as the thesis that  
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whether a belief is warranted and amounts to knowledge merely depends on whether the 
process by which it is produced is of the right kind or type, quite independently of 
whether the believer is, or can become, aware of whether it is indeed of the right kind.10 
 
Here, ‘being of the right kind or type’ has to do with whether the type of process in question 
makes it probable that the beliefs it produces are true. This characterization is atypical and also 
problematic. By limiting possible warrant-conferring factors to the reliability of belief-producing 
processes, it prematurely excludes various forms of externalism that do not analyze positive 
epistemic status in such terms.11 Moreover, Philipse makes the internalism/externalism 
dichotomy non-exhaustive. He labels as internalist those views that require that a subject has 
cognitive access to what confers positive epistemic status on a belief. As a result, views which 
hold (a) that there are other factors that contribute to the positive epistemic status of a belief 
besides (or instead of) the reliability of the process by which it is produced and (b) that a subject 
needs to have cognitive access to some but not all of the factors that confer positive epistemic 
status come out as neither internalist nor externalist.12 These problems set the stage for later 
misinterpretations of Plantinga’s view, as we will see in due course. 
 Third, like most externalists, Plantinga accepts that warranted beliefs can lose their 
positive epistemic status when they are confronted with defeaters. A defeater for a belief is an 
experience or propositional attitude that you come to have and that takes away the warrant or 
rationality of your initial belief. To acquire one, you must come to have the experience or 
propositional attitude in question and also see its defeating connection with your original belief. 
Defeaters come in two kinds: a rebutting defeater is a ground or reason to think that your initial 
belief is false and an undercutting defeater is a ground or reason to think that the grounds or 
reasons for your initial belief are not indicative of its truth or that the source from which it came 
is unreliable.13 Whether something is a defeater doesn’t just depend on your initial belief and 
current experiences in isolation, but also on the rest of what you know and believe. If I read in 
the newspaper that a famous actor has died, I would normally acquire a (rebutting) defeater for 
my belief that this actor is alive. However, if my friend, who is an editor at the newspaper, has 
told me earlier that they made an egregious mistake by printing this actor’s obituary in the paper 
while she hasn’t actually died, I do not acquire said defeater. Alternatively, if I speak to my 
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friend after reading the obituary, I thereby acquire a defeater for my defeater for my belief that 
the actor is alive. Defeaters can be defeated by further experiences or beliefs that take away or 
undermine the warrant or rationality of the defeater in question. 
 Contrary to what Philipse appears to think, acceptance of a no-defeater condition (NDC) 
on warranted beliefs does not make Plantinga’s account of warrant surreptitiously internalist.14 
Note first that this follows directly from the standard account of the internalism/externalism 
distinction cited above. Even if an NDC were a clearly internalist condition (which it isn’t), 
Plantinga’s view would still not require cognitive access to all warrant-conferring factors. 
Second, no matter which precise characterization of the internalism/externalism distinction one 
prefers, it is generally accepted that adding an NDC to an externalist account of positive 
epistemic status does not make that account internalist.15 Third, however, it is important to 
understand that the NDC Plantinga works with does not add an extra positive condition to the 
basic account of warrant. Warrant does not also require a subject to have the belief that she has 
no defeaters. Warrant is conferred only by the four factors cited above. The idea is rather that 
someone’s warranted belief is in fact not subject to defeaters. The basic NDC is thus externalist. 
Cognitive access only comes in view once a subject actually acquires a defeater (and defeater-
defeater, etc.), because having a defeater by definition involves being aware of it. 
 
3. Two Red Herrings 
 
We can be brief about the first two objections to Plantinga’s account of warranted Christian 
belief, since both of them are red herrings, as Philipse also acknowledges. 
 The first objection concerns the A/C model’s logical force, which Philipse claims is very 
limited for two reasons. First, it is conditional in two respects. Since it incorporates exclusively 
Christian doctrines, its import is limited to people who endorse these doctrines. In addition, the 
plausibility of the model is conditional on the existence of God. If there is no God, then Christian 
belief will not be warranted in the basic way. Plantinga’s account, however, does nothing to 
answer the question of God’s existence.16 Secondly, Philipse thinks the model is only useful for a 
small group of people. It only provides comfort to ‘unwavering Christians’ who do not doubt the 
truth of their religious beliefs. As far as intelligent, reflective Christians and non-believers are 
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concerned, Plantinga’s account of warranted Christian belief ‘merely depicts a logical 
possibility’.17  
 These claims fall flat on closer inspection. Since the explicitly and repeatedly stated 
purpose of Plantinga’s account is to provide Christian believers with an appropriate way in 
which to conceive of the positive epistemic status of their Christian beliefs, it is nothing against 
it that it does only that. Next, Plantinga readily admits that the plausibility of the extended A/C 
model is conditional on the truth of Christian theism.18 He wants to show that Christians can 
rationally endorse their religious beliefs if God exists, thereby refuting the frequently voiced 
complaint that theistic belief is intellectually unacceptable regardless of whether it is true. 
Perhaps Philipse deems the truth of theistic belief a more important issue; perhaps he wishes that 
Plantinga would have done more to argue for it. That’s fine; but this does not even so much as 
slyly suggest that there is a problem with the A/C model. Finally, the claim that Plantinga’s 
model is useful only to unwavering Christians is easily refuted. In fact, Philipse already does so 
himself, albeit in a footnote: 
 
Plantinga will answer (correctly) that his extended A/C model is indeed hypothetical, but 
that it also does great services both to Christian believers and to those who want to 
criticize religious beliefs. Christian believers who have doubts concerning the truth of 
their creed merely on the ground that they cannot support it by arguments or evidence, 
will be comforted by the model, since it shows that such arguments of positive 
apologetics are not necessarily necessary. And the model teaches critics of religion that 
de jure objections to religious belief must be grounded in de facto objections.19 
  
Quite apart from this, various claims in the periphery of the model contain suggestions — all of 
them rooted firmly in the Christian tradition — for how the sensus divinitatis might be triggered 
and how the Holy Spirit might reveal the ‘great truths of the gospel’ to our minds. Surely, this is 
of use to wavering and unwavering Christians alike, as well as to agnostics and atheists. 
 The second objection is a version of the generality problem for reliabilism.20 Because 
warrant is partly determined by the reliability of cognitive processes, Plantinga’s account is 
broadly reliabilist. Hence, it is confronted by the problem of generality which arises 
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because one may describe at many different levels of generality the actual token-process 
by which a belief that p is generated in a subject. As a result, this process may fall both 
under reliable kinds or types and under unreliable kinds of processes, whereas there may 
not be a principled manner of choosing between them.21 
 
Plantinga’s conditions for warrant are supposed to eliminate this problem, Philipse explains, 
because the design plan determines a unique level of generality at which to describe the 
cognitive processes involved. However, he claims that when the theory of warrant is applied to 
the production of religious belief, the problem re-emerges. Because we cannot test whether the 
sensus divinitatis is a reliable belief-forming process, we cannot tell whether the resulting 
religious beliefs enjoy warrant in the basic way; the level of generality at which the functioning 
of this belief-producing faculty is to be described is uncertain.22  
 This objection, too, comes to nothing. On an externalist account of warrant such as 
Plantinga’s, you can be fully warranted in endorsing properly basic religious beliefs in spite of 
your (or anyone’s) inability to discover whether the conditions for warrant are satisfied. That you 
may be unable to find out which level of generality is the right level is simply irrelevant as long 
as there is in fact a correct level. Philipse agrees:  
 
[T]he problem of generality is not a decisive objection against the logical and epistemic 
possibility of a warranted basic belief that God exists. What the problem shows is merely 
that even if God exists (…) we humans can never discover by calibrating tests whether 
our religious beliefs are warranted as properly basic or not.23  
 
The problem of generality turns out to be a red herring as well. 
 
4. Religious Pluralism Defeated, Part I 
 
We move to Philipse’s third objection; the one he claims to be insuperable. The core of this 
objection is that serious awareness of religious diversity constitutes a defeater for the 
intellectually responsible modern Christian.24 Suppose Adam, who is the epitome of modernity 
and intellectual responsibility, has a warranted belief that Jesus is the son of God. He becomes 
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deeply aware of the fact that there are many Muslims who deny this and who are, to all 
appearances, just as modern and intellectually responsible as he himself is. Their testimony 
constitutes a rebutting defeater for his belief.25 Perhaps serious awareness of the world’s rich 
religious diversity also constitutes an undercutting defeater because it should lead Adam to doubt 
the veracity of his own source of religious beliefs. The fact that so many intelligent and well-
informed people have incompatible religious beliefs doesn’t quite entail that his own source of 
religious beliefs is unreliable, but it goes some way towards suggesting it. Note that Philipse 
cannot be content to argue that religious diversity could constitute a defeater for some Christian 
believers.26 His goal is to argue that Christian belief cannot be warranted in the manner of 
properly basic beliefs, so he must show that religious diversity always constitutes an undefeated 
defeater for the modern intellectually responsible believer. 
 Is it indeed the case that awareness of religious diversity inevitably gives Adam a 
defeater for his Christian belief? There are two options available to someone who seeks to 
defend Plantinga’s position. She could either argue that awareness of religious diversity fails to 
constitute a defeater for Adam in the first place, or she could argue that Adam can obtain a 
defeater-defeater. We explore the first option in this section and the second in the next. 
 The first option might seem hopeless at first sight. To claim that awareness of religious 
diversity does not constitute a defeater sounds like dogmatic demotion of the opinions of others. 
Holding on to your beliefs in the face of recognized controversy may seem epistemically 
irresponsible and irrational. However, there are plenty of occasions where we not only discount 
others’ opinions, but do so rationally. For instance, when you know that others are not as well-
informed about an issue as you are, that they are less reliable or adept at reasoning vis-à-vis the 
issue, or that they lack access to some of the evidence or a source of information to which you do 
have access. In such cases, testimony of others that conflicts with a belief of yours will not take 
away the warrant or rationality of your belief, because relative to the rest of what you know, it 
fails to constitute a defeater. 
 This may be so even when you are willing to grant such things as (a) that those who 
disagree with you are generally speaking your ‘epistemic peers’, i.e., that, apart from your 
disagreement about the issue at hand, they are as well-informed about matters, intelligent, 
thoughtful, free from bias, etc.27 as you are, (b) that they might have the same ‘internal markers’ 
as you do, i.e., feel just as confident and secure that their belief is true, and (c) that you cannot 
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produce an argument or any other piece of evidence that would convince others that they are 
wrong. 
 In fact, it seems to us that this is how things sometimes go in disagreements about basic 
ethical, political, and philosophical issues. You disagree with people who appear to be your 
epistemic peers, you might become convinced that they feel just as confident and secure about 
their conflicting belief as you do about yours, and you might be unable to produce arguments 
that would get them to reconsider their belief. Nonetheless, you cannot help believing that you 
are right. You have thought the issue over carefully, trying to take in all the relevant facts and 
circumstances, and in full awareness of the diversity of opinion that surrounds the issue. Still, 
you find yourself with a strong belief that things are as you judge them to be and, by implication, 
that those who disagree with you are wrong. Plantinga himself gives an example: 
 
Perhaps you have always believed it deeply wrong for a counselor to use his position of 
trust to seduce a client. Perhaps you discover that others disagree; they think it more like 
a minor peccadillo, like running a red light when there’s no traffic; and you realize that 
possibly these people have the same internal markers for their beliefs that you have for 
yours. You think the matter over more fully, imaginatively re-­‐create and rehearse such 
situations, become more aware of just what is involved in such a situation (the breach of 
trust, the injustice and unfairness, the nasty irony of a situation in which someone comes 
to a counselor seeking help but receives only hurt), and come to believe even more firmly 
that such an action is wrong.28 
 
We are strongly inclined to agree with Plantinga here. In situations like these, holding on to your 
own belief is the rational thing to do and conflicting testimony of others fails to give you a 
defeater.29 
 But even apart from the defensibility of this general point, the pertinent question is 
whether Plantinga’s account of how Christian belief can be warranted has the resources to 
support the claim that awareness of religious diversity need not even constitute a defeater in the 
first place. This, we will now show, is beyond doubt, in spite of Philipse’s misgivings.30 
 Let’s suppose that Adam’s belief that Jesus is the son of God has a lot of warrant for him; 
his sensus divinitatis functions properly and the Holy Spirit has sealed the belief upon his heart. 
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Adam, being the intellectually responsible man that he is, understands that if he knows that p, 
people who believe that not-p are wrong. Hence, he thinks that Muslims and others who deny 
that Jesus is the son of God must be wrong. Perhaps he has some sort of explanation for why 
they are wrong, which makes it rational for him to ignore their testimony. Philipse gives an 
example of such an explanation, but he deems belief in this particular one deeply immoral and 
unjustified for decent Christians. Adam could believe 
 
that all Muslims are wicked and that God rightly punishes them for their sins by 
deforming their sensus divinitatis and by intentionally withholding from them the 
redeeming insight in His incarnation.31 
 
But of course, there are less demeaning explanations as well. For instance, Adam could merely 
believe that he has been graced in a way that others have not, but perhaps will be later. Perhaps 
Adam doesn’t really believe in one particular explanation; perhaps he just believes that some 
such explanation must be correct. He wouldn’t believe this because he has an argument or other 
independent evidence for its truth; it would be something that makes sense of his conviction that 
those who deny that Jesus is the son of God are wrong, where this latter conviction is 
straightforwardly entailed by his belief that Jesus is God’s son, which we assumed to be highly 
warranted. 
 Plantinga could even maintain that Adam can hold on to his belief without having 
anything by way of explanation for why conflicting testimony can be discarded. This is because 
Adam’s belief could have a great deal of what Plantinga calls intrinsic warrant, so that it forms 
its own defeater-defeater or, as Plantinga sometimes says, an intrinsic neutralizer.32 Some beliefs 
of ours have so much warrant that potential defeaters for it do not stick. For instance, when I 
remember clearly that I spent all of yesterday sick in bed, my friends’ sincere testimony that they 
saw me at the train station does not defeat my belief, not even if they tell me that they’re sure of 
it and show me photos of someone who admittedly looks a lot like me. My belief has so much 
warrant for me because I actually remember where I was. As a result of this (but not as an 
argument for it) I believe I have access to a privileged source of knowledge regarding my 
whereabouts that others do not have. 
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 Something analogous can happen with religious belief. Adam’s belief could have been 
powerfully produced in him and forcefully revealed to his mind. And because of this, he believes 
that others who hold conflicting religious beliefs are wrong; they lack access to a privileged 
source of knowledge to which he has been granted access. Hence, conflicting testimony of other 
religious believers fails to constitute a defeater for Adam. Thus Plantinga: 
 
If the believer concedes that she doesn’t have any special source of knowledge or true 
belief with respect to Christian belief—no sensus divinitatis, no internal instigation of the 
Holy Spirit, no teaching by a church inspired and protected from error by the Holy Spirit, 
nothing available to those who disagree with her—then, perhaps, she will have a defeater 
for her Christian belief.33 
 
In light of what has been said so far, it should be clear that the belief in question about having 
access to a source of warranted belief that others lack, is a straightforward implication of the 
believer’s original warranted Christian beliefs. Hence, Philipse radically misinterprets 
Plantinga’s position when he writes that: 
 
While the original warrant for the Christian belief (p) was a purely externalist one (…), 
this warrant is now backed up by an internalist justifying argument (j), namely that the 
believer has the original warrant, and that such a warrant is lacking in the case of those 
who endorse incompatible beliefs.34 
 
This interpretation gets the intended order of explanation exactly wrong. Plantinga’s suggestion 
is emphatically not that j justifies p, but that the Christian believer is committed to believing 
something like j because that follows from her strongly warranted belief that p.35 
 Perhaps, however, there is something wrong with the idea that religious beliefs can have 
enough intrinsic warrant. Philipse certainly thinks so. He formulates two objections.36 First, he 
says that even though Christians might have intrinsic neutralizers if Christian theism were true, 
this wouldn’t help them in a discussion with other religious believers because they in their turn 
might appeal to an analogous account of the intrinsic warrant of their belief, conditional on the 
truth of their religious belief system.  
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 It’s hard to see how this is even supposed to be an objection. The fact that Plantinga’s 
position won’t help the Christian believer in a discussion with other believers is neither here nor 
there. Nobody ever suggested otherwise. Next, the mere fact that other religious believers could 
appeal to an analogous account of warranted belief entails neither the falsity of Christian belief 
nor the falsity of Plantinga’s account of warranted Christian belief. Also, it does not entail that  
Christian belief lacks warrant. Upon hearing such appeals, the Christian believer will simply 
think that they must be mistaken, in virtue of her having strongly warranted Christian beliefs.37 
 The second objection is more involved. Philipse suggests that the reason why memory 
beliefs can have intrinsic warrant is that their warrant derives from perceptual beliefs. The latter, 
in turn, can have so much warrant because they involve transparent access to their truth-makers. 
In (properly) forming a (true) perceptual belief, (a) the truth-maker for that belief is directly 
present to you and (b) you recognize this to be so. He further stipulates that the warrant for such 
perceptual belief comes partly from (b), i.e., your recognizing the truth-maker to be directly 
present to you. In effect, then, he adds a condition to Plantinga’s basic account of warrant. In 
order for a basic perceptual belief to have high intrinsic warrant, Philipse claims, it not only has 
to meet the four conditions outlined in section 2 to a high degree, it also has to meet a transparent 
access condition, which requires cognitive access to one of the warrant-conferring factors. 
Philipse goes on to argue that Christian belief cannot meet this transparent access condition. 
What triggers Christian beliefs (e.g., reading the Bible or a feeling that God disapproves of what 
you have done) is not identical with the truth-makers of these beliefs. Christian beliefs thus fail 
to satisfy the transparent access condition.38 As a result, it is impossible for Christian beliefs to 
acquire the status of intrinsic neutralizers. 
 This objection is uncompelling on several counts. First of all, it is dialectically 
problematic to first argue that your opponent ought to accept certain additions to his view and 
then to base your objection solely on problems with these additions. A fortiori when the additions 
in question are wholly foreign to the view in question, because they supplement a thoroughly 
externalist account of warrant with an internalist access condition. Thus, the natural thing to do 
for Plantinga would be to insist that, notwithstanding Philipse’s claims to the contrary, having 
intrinsic warrant really is just a matter of meeting the four conditions discussed above to a high 
degree. Then, given the A/C model, nothing stands in the way of Christian belief indeed having 
intrinsic warrant. With that, the objection is dead in the water. 
Penultimate version. Minor textual revisions in published version. 
 14 
 But suppose we ignore this point and grant that acquiring a perceptual belief with high 
intrinsic warrant indeed requires transparent access to its truth-maker. This may be so, but why 
think that this is the only way in which beliefs (perceptual or other) can come to be intrinsic 
neutralizers? Philipse provides no arguments for this claim. Since Plantinga says that beliefs 
produced by the sensus are like perceptual beliefs but not exactly analogous to them,39 it may be 
that they acquire high intrinsic warrant in a slightly different manner than do perceptual beliefs. 
Considering powerful moral or rational intuitions helps to make this more plausible. Seeing that 
modus ponens is a valid form of reasoning does not appear to involve transparent access to the 
truth-maker of the belief in question, but it seems highly plausible to us that our belief that 
modus ponens is valid has enough intrinsic warrant to ward off defeaters in the form of 
countervailing testimony from others. 
 Even if transparent access in Philipse’s sense were required, there is room to argue that 
Christian beliefs, or at least some of them, can satisfy this condition. Space precludes us from 
discussing William Alston’s impressive case for the possibility of veridical perception of God,40 
but we can at least hint at a different possible example. Suppose Adam comes to believe 
correctly, upon seeing a majestic mountain peak, that God sustains it. The truth-maker for such a 
belief is God’s sustaining activity, which, presumably, is indeed present in the mountain peak, in 
so far as we can speak of activities being present at specific locations. Of course, God’s activity 
wouldn’t be perceivable in the same straightforward sense as ordinary material objects, but it 
seems to us at least possible that Adam could be aware of God’s activity and recognize this to be 
so, although offering a detailed account of this would require serious work. 
 The upshot of what we have said so far is simple: Philipse has not shown that serious 
awareness of religious pluralism always constitutes a defeater for the modern and intellectually 
responsible Christian believer. 
 
5. Religious Pluralism Defeated, Part II 
 
Although we believe the arguments of the previous section to be sufficient to establish that 
Philipse has not made his case, it remains possible that awareness of religious diversity does give 
some Christians a defeater. How could this be so? There are several options. The arguments of 
the previous section depended on the assumption that Adam’s beliefs had a great deal of warrant 
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for him to begin with. Of course, this is not true for all believers. For someone whose beliefs 
barely meet the threshold for knowledge, a serious encounter with religious diversity can 
constitute a defeater. It might also be argued that awareness of religious diversity constitutes an 
undercutting defeater by making salient the possibility that one’s religious belief-forming 
faculties are unreliable. After all, the fact that so many seemingly equally intelligent, sincere, and 
well-informed individuals come to hold conflicting religious beliefs would be well explained by 
the general unreliability of religious belief-forming faculties. This line of thought could be 
strengthened further by noting that non-Christian religious believers may attempt to appeal to 
suitably adapted versions of Plantinga’s A/C model to show how their religious beliefs could be 
warranted in the manner of properly basic beliefs. This seems to confirm the apparent epistemic 
parity between religious believers of various stripes.41 Finally, unwarranted or irrationally held 
beliefs, too, can be defeaters.42 Perhaps some Christians simply misjudge the argumentative 
force of the objection from religious diversity, deeming it much stronger than someone with 
properly functioning cognitive faculties would. In that case, they will also acquire a defeater for 
their Christian beliefs. 
 We will now go on to argue that — within the framework of Plantinga’s extended A/C 
model — it is perfectly possible for those Christians who acquire a defeater by becoming 
seriously aware of religious diversity to acquire a defeater-defeater and thus to go on to have 
warranted basic Christian beliefs. 
 Suppose Abel is a Christian for whom awareness of religious diversity initially 
constitutes a defeater. Abel might attempt to ward off this defeater by producing arguments for 
the truth of his original Christian beliefs and thus engage in natural theology. This is a perfectly 
fine project and it may well be successful too. However, as Philipse rightly notes, this would 
defeat the purpose of Plantinga’s project, which was to show how Christian belief can be 
properly basic, i.e., rational and warranted while not based on explicit evidence and arguments.43 
 What else can be done? Abel could start to think the matter over, soberly considering the 
facts of religious diversity, pondering his original Christian beliefs and their potential positive 
epistemic status. He could go for a hike and accidentally witness a beautiful sunset and come to 
believe that God created it. He could read the Bible or go to church and, in doing so, form the 
belief that God is speaking to him, that Jesus is God’s son, etc. Such actions, and many more, 
can trigger a renewed and more powerful working of his sensus divinitatis or can become the 
Penultimate version. Minor textual revisions in published version. 
 16 
occasion for a forceful internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, leading to confirmed and more 
firmly held Christian beliefs. (Nothing guarantees that this is how things will go. Surely, there 
can be Christians for whom no such thing happens and for whom Christian belief becomes 
irrational and unwarranted.) In line with the externalist outlook of the A/C model, Abel’s 
experiences shouldn’t be thought of as forming the basis of an explicit argument for the truth of 
his beliefs, a quick conscious inference, or any other cognitively accessible ground for belief. 
Like his original beliefs, the powerfully reproduced Christian beliefs would be warranted in the 
way of properly basic beliefs too. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, we’ll let Plantinga speak 
for himself once more: 
 
A fresh or heightened awareness of the facts of religious pluralism could bring about a 
reappraisal of one's religious life, a reawakening, a new or renewed and deepened grasp 
and apprehension of [Christian truths]. From the perspective of the extended A/C model, 
it could serve as an occasion for a renewed and more powerful working of the belief-
producing processes by which we come to apprehend [Christian truths]. In this way 
knowledge of the facts of pluralism could initially serve as a defeater; in the long run, 
however, it can have precisely the opposite effect.44 
 
To summarize: the idea is that the defeater for Christian beliefs presented by religious diversity 
can be defeated when those very same Christian beliefs are produced anew and with greater 
strength through the same belief-forming processes by which they were originally formed. We 
take it that Plantinga’s point here really boils down to the suggestion that Abel’s Christian beliefs 
might come to have enough intrinsic warrant to ward off defeat once he has formed them again. 
 Philipse might have objected to this in the following way.45 This suggestion amounts to 
saying that having the mere belief that your Christian beliefs have been reliably produced is 
enough to neutralize the defeater. Clearly, that is unacceptable once you realize that religious 
diversity ought to be construed as an undercutting defeater, for adherents of other religions might 
as well claim that they are fully confident that their conflicting beliefs have been reliably 
produced in them by analogous religious-belief-forming processes. To defeat this undercutting 
defeater, you need independent evidence for the reliability of your belief-forming processes.46 
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 In reply, note first that the objection overlooks an important element in Plantinga’s 
suggestion. It’s not having the mere belief that your Christian beliefs have been reliably 
produced that is supposed to do the defeater-defeating; rather, it is having those beliefs 
powerfully reproduced in you. Possibly, as a result of seeing the logical implications of your 
confirmed belief, you would also form the further belief that you are right and those with 
conflicting religious beliefs wrong. 
 Nonetheless, Philipse might insist, in order to acquire a defeater-defeater you need 
independent evidence showing that you are right and others are wrong. Without such evidence it 
would be arbitrary and irrational for you to stick to your beliefs. In reply, we will readily grant 
that there are several kinds of cases where this demand seems eminently reasonable. When you 
and an epistemic peer have a persistent disagreement about the solution to a math problem, the 
rational thing to do is to look for help from an outside source and suspend belief in the 
meantime. Similarly, when you and your partner have differing recollections of an event, you 
should look for independent confirmation of either of your beliefs.47 However, it doesn’t follow 
from this that the demand for independent evidence applies universally. Although fully arguing 
the point is beyond the scope of this paper, we maintain that there are several domains of the 
intellectual life where it is possible to have rational beliefs in spite of the fact that independent 
evidence is very hard, if not impossible, to come by. Thus, we think it is true of several of our 
ethical, political, and philosophical beliefs that:  
 
a. We hold them rationally (perhaps even with warrant); 
b. We are aware of others who are, for all we can tell, our epistemic peers, who hold 
conflicting beliefs with as much inner confidence as we do, and whom we would be 
unable to convince by arguments or other evidence; and 
c. We do not have independent evidence for thinking that our belief-forming processes are 
(in general or on this occasion) more likely to be right than those of others.48 
 
The belief that it is wrong for a counselor to abuse his position of trust, cited in the previous 
section, is as good an example as any. It seems perfectly possible that (b) and (c) are true for this 
belief. Nevertheless, we may feel utterly convinced of the truth of this belief, it may have been 
produced in us by properly functioning cognitive faculties, operating in the appropriate 
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environment etc., and it may thus meet the conditions for warrant and rationality, so that (a) is 
true of it as well.49 
 Plantinga is most naturally understood as saying that what goes for ethical, political, and 
philosophical beliefs, also goes for religious beliefs. Even though Abel can muster no 
independent evidence for his renewed Christian beliefs or for the claim that his belief-forming 
processes are more reliable than those of other believers, he feels utterly convinced that his 
Christian beliefs are true. In consequence, he will think that those who disagree with him are 
wrong, for some reason or other. With this, we are back to the discussion of intrinsic warrant in 
the previous section.50 
 For those who continue to have sympathy for the demand for independent evidence, it 
might help to consider its consequences. If we are right in our earlier assessment of the epistemic 
status of many ethical, political, and religious beliefs, imposing this demand would force modern 
and intellectually responsible people to give up many of their beliefs in these areas and to 
become agnostics. Holding on to these beliefs would be irrational for them, no matter how 
conscientiously they have thought things through. We take this as a reductio of the demand for 
independent evidence. As an aside, note that this demand would force Philipse himself, too, to 
give up his atheistic beliefs and become an agnostic since he is confronted with at least two peers 
—Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne — who, we venture to predict, remain unconvinced of 
his arguments.51 
 Hence, Philipse has not shown that the Christian believer for whom religious diversity at 
first constitutes a defeater cannot acquire a defeater-defeater. Since we already saw in the 
previous section that there may be Christians for whom religious diversity need not even 
constitute a defeater, the overall conclusion so far is that we have not been given a reason for 
thinking that serious awareness of religious diversity always constitutes a defeater for the 
modern and intellectually responsible Christian believer. 
 
6. Explaining Religious Beliefs 
 
There is a delicate problem of interpretation concerning Philipse’s final objection. As he presents 
it, it is conditional on his having established the impossibility of Christian beliefs possessing 
enough intrinsic warrant to ward off the defeater of diversity. Because of this, he explains, 
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Christians will have to produce arguments to defeat many potential defeaters.52 Perhaps, 
however, friends of the A/C model could maintain that Christians will only need to produce 
negative arguments to rebut those potential defeaters, and that no positive arguments for the truth 
of their own beliefs are required. If so, their religious beliefs could retain their warranted and 
properly basic status even though believers would have to engage in some argumentation to 
protect this status from potential defeat. Philipse then claims that there is at least one defeater for 
which this negative strategy will not work: the availability of secular explanations for religious 
belief, in particular those from the blooming field of the cognitive science of religion (CSR).53 
This particular defeater forces the believer to provide positive arguments for the truth of 
Christian theism, because  
 
one might conceive of such a secular explanation of religious beliefs on the one hand, and 
the hypothetical explanation of by the extended A/C model on the other hand, as rivals in 
a contest for the best explanation of existing religious beliefs. In order to win this contest, 
Christian believers will have to show that their (…) explanation (…) is better.54 
 
Doing so amounts to offering positive arguments for the truth of Christian theism. Philipse thinks 
this contest is a run race. Because the secular explanation posits one kind of entity less (to wit, 
God), it is simpler than the A/C model. It is, moreover, confirmed by ‘massive empirical 
evidence’ whereas the A/C model is not backed up by any empirical evidence. Finally, if 
Christian believers were to argue that the A/C model is the best explanation for their beliefs, they 
would be left with difficult questions about the explanation of non-Christian religious beliefs. 
Should they be explained by secular explanations? If so, why would Christian beliefs be the 
exception? 
 In response, the obvious thing to say is that if the arguments of the previous sections are 
sound, this objection is a non-starter. If Christian beliefs can have enough warrant to function as 
intrinsic neutralizers, then Philipse is mistaken in thinking that rationality requires Christian 
believers to provide independent evidence or arguments against potential defeaters. 
 We think, however, that Philipse weakens the objection unnecessarily by making it 
conditional on his earlier discussion of intrinsic warrant and religious diversity. So let’s consider 
whether the explanations of religious beliefs developed by CSR55 form an independent defeater. 
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In order to do so, they would either have to entail the falsity of Christian beliefs (a rebutting 
defeater) or entail the unreliability of Christian belief-forming processes (an undercutting 
defeater). It is clear that they do not do the former. Systematic observations about how natural 
teleological thinking is to children or detailed stories about how the evolution of humankind may 
have led us to form religious beliefs of certain sorts do not have any straightforward implications 
for the question of the truth of Christian beliefs. To claim otherwise would be to commit the 
genetic fallacy. Arguing that they form an undercutting defeater is therefore more promising, as 
Philipse himself also admits.56 So do they? 
 This is a complicated question that raises more issues than we can do justice to here.57 
However, we can make a few brief observations and point to literature in which the implications 
of CSR explanations for theistic belief are discussed at length. First, on Plantinga’s account, 
theistic belief isn’t accepted as an explanatory hypothesis for anything. It is a properly basic 
belief. The Christian believer has no reason to go along with the idea that CSR explanations and 
the A/C model are in a competition for the prize of the best explanation of religious belief.58 
Hence, considerations about empirical adequacy, simplicity, and other criteria for choosing the 
best explanation are beside the point. 
 Second, Philipse immediately sets up a competition between CSR explanations and the 
Christian theistic explanation. As Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett have argued, however, 
many CSR findings sit quite well with at least the basic A/C model.59 To poise them against each 
other as mutually exclusive alternatives is thus premature. One could even go further and argue 
that some CSR findings offer positive empirical support for Plantinga’s model. 
 Third, establishing that the religious belief-forming processes uncovered by CSR are 
unreliable so that CSR explanations form an undercutting defeater is far more complicated than 
Philipse lets on. Obviously, if the falsity of theism were assumed, their unreliability would 
follow immediately. But such an assumption begs the question. Next, the mere fact that our 
religious belief-forming processes have evolutionary origins doesn’t entail their unreliability. If it 
did, the same would go for all our belief-forming processes60 — a consequence everyone will 
find unpalatable. Hence, it must be some special feature of religious belief-forming processes 
that accounts for their alleged unreliability. Prima facie plausible candidates might include the 
facts that (a) these processes are known to be unreliable in other areas; (b) they produce mutually 
exclusive beliefs in different people; (c) they do not have the appropriate relationship to the 
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object(s) about which they produce beliefs; or (d) they have not been properly subject to 
winnowing forces of natural selection. However, Michael Murray has argued that none of these 
features leads to the desired conclusion, at least not without further question-begging 
assumptions.61 
 We fully realize that these sketchy remarks leave a lot to be desired. Nonetheless, they 
should at least make it clear that, if Philipse really wants to argue that CSR explanations form an 
undercutting defeater for Christian beliefs, he has much more work to do. For the time being, we 
have been given no good reason to think that CSR explanations show Christian beliefs to be 
unreliably produced.62 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have shown that none of Philipse’s criticisms of Plantinga’s extended A/C model is 
successful. Plantinga’s claim that even modern and intellectually responsible Christian believers 
can be rational and warranted in holding on to their Christian beliefs even when they do not have 
explicit evidence or arguments to back them up is neither ‘shipwrecked’ nor ‘conclusively 
refuted’.63 On the contrary, it survives unscathed and is as plausible as it ever was. 
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